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Abstract: We suggest an improved plug-and-play measurement-device-independent (MDI)
continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) via the dual-phase modulation (DPM),
aiming to solve an implementation problem with no extra performance penalty. The synchronous
loophole of different lasers from Alice and Bob can be elegantly eliminated in the plug-and-play
configuration, which gives birth to the convenient implementation when comparing to the
Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocol. While the local oscillator (LO) can be locally
generated by the trusted part Charlie, the LO-aimed attacks can be accurately detected in the
data post-processing. We derive the security bounds of the DPM-based MDI-CVQKD against
optimal Gaussian collective attacks. Taking the finite-size effect into account, the secret key
rate can be increased due to the fact that almost all raw keys of the MDI-CVQKD system can
be fully exploited for the final secret key generation without sacrificing raw keys in parameter
estimation. Moreover, we give an experimental concept of the proposed scheme which can be
deemed guideline for final implementation.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a branch of quantum cryptography, whose goal is to
provide an elegant way to allow two remote legitimate partners (Alice and Bob) to generate
a random secure key with unconditional security [3, 4] over insecure quantum and classical
channels. There are two approaches to implement QKD, i.e., discrete-variable (DV) QKD [5,6]
and continuous-variable (CV) QKD [7–10]. In DVQKD, the polarization states of a single photon
are usually exploited to transmit the information of key bits, whereas in CVQKD, the sender,
Alice, usually encodes key bits in the quadratures (xˆ and pˆ) of the optical field with Gaussian
modulation [11], and the receiver, Bob, can restore the secret key bits through high-speed and
high-efficiency homodyne or heterodyne detection techniques [12].
Currently, the CVQKD protocol has been implemented through the established standard
telecommunication facilities, which is more convenient and practical than its DVQKD counterpart.
However, there is usually an assumption that devices are perfect and cannot be eavesdropped by
the third untrusted party, and consequently doubts about the immaculate CVQKD system have
been raised. An ideal model of CVQKD is not enough for the security analysis of the practical
CVQKD system. For example, there is no need to consider the effect of local oscillator (LO) in
ideal models but it is necessary to take it into account in the practical CVQKD system, since
eavesdroppers may exploit the transmitted LO to launch practical attacks such as wavelength
attacks [13, 14], saturation attacks [15], calibration attacks [16], and LO fluctuation attacks [17].
Furthermore, the imperfections of detectors can be maliciously exploited, which make the
CVQKD system vulnerable to various attacks. To remove all existing and yet-to-be-discovered
detector side channels, measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD was proposed [18–20]. It
offers an immense security advantage over standard security proofs and has the power to double
the secure distance [19].
So far, much progress has been made in MDI-DVQKD [21–25] and MDI-CVQKD [26–29].
In a MDI-CVQKD protocol, both Alice and Bob are senders while an untrusted third party
Charlie is introduced to realize Bell measurements. Such measurement results will be used by
Alice and Bob in post-processing to generate the secure keys. MDI-CVQKD has become an
important research limelight since it has many practical advantages, especially for a metropolitan
QKD network [30]. Subsequently, C. Lupo et al. presented the composable security proof of
MDI-CVQKD against coherent attacks [31]. However, the theoretical feasibility does not usually
mean its experimental implement although its theoretical security has been proven. In the other
words, the implementation of MDI-CVQKD at present may be impractical. For example, a
strong light (LO) with weak signal light is required for realizing the practical CVQKD [32].
Because these two lights have to be precisely interfered in homodyne or heterodyne detector,
the synchronization of the two beams is crucial to implement CVQKD communication. While
this problem magnifies doubly in MDI-CVQKD with two senders Alice and Bob, it renders
MDI-CVQKD hard to implement stably. Moreover, the Gaussian-modulated coherent states are
prepared for Alice and Bob with symmetrical modulation, which is usually implemented by
applying an amplify modulator (AM) and a phase modulator (PM). Unfortunately, most of the
widely used AMs, e.g. LiNbO3 modulators, are polarization sensitive and features a polarizer,
which means the part of light cannot be transmitted if its orientation is not aligned correctly [33].
As a result, the performance of the practical MDI-CVQKD system will be degenerated.
To solve the above-mentioned problems, in this paper, we suggest a plug-and-play (PP) scheme
for MDI-CVQKD via the dual-phase modulation (DPM). In particular, the proposed scheme
waives the necessity of propagation of the LO through the insecure quantum channels from
Alice’s and Bob’s sides. Instead, the real LO is generated from the same laser of quantum signal
at Charlie’s side, and thus it avoids the problems of synchronization of different lasers as well as
the LO-aimed attacks. Moreover, the reference of two signals can be guaranteed identically and
the polarization drifts can be compensated automatically since only one laser is needed for the PP
DPM-basedMDI-CVQKD.Meanwhile, a polarization-insensitive dual-phase modulation strategy
is adopted to Alice’s and Bob’s sides respectively which shows the experimental feasibility of
preparing Gaussian states. We derive the security bounds against optimal Gaussian collective
attacks, which shows that the proposed scheme works equivalently to symmetrically modulated
Gaussian-state MDI-CVQKD protocols. When taking into account the finite-size effect almost all
raw keys generated by the proposed scheme can be used for final secret key generation, without
sacrificing any raw keys in parameter estimation.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we describe the traditional MDI-CVQKD
protocol, and subsequently propose the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD. In Sec. III, we focus on
the security analysis with numerical simulation in asymptotic limit and finite-size regime. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Sec. IV.
2. The PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol
To make the derivation of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol self-contained, we illustrate
the characteristics of the MDI-CVQKD protocol and then extend it to the PP DPM-based
MDI-CVQKD protocol.
2.1. Characteristics of the MDI-CVQKD protocol
In the MDI-CVQKD protocol, the side-channel attacks can be eliminated since one does not
need to make any assumption on the measurement device. As shown in Fig. 1.(a), two lasers
are adopted to Alice’s and Bob’s side respectively, where each side modulates information
independently using AM and PM. After that, the two Gaussian-modulated pulses are sent to
Charlie who measures the incoming modes with Bell state measurement (BSM). In particular,
the prepare-and-measure model of MDI-CVQKD protocol can be described as follows.
Fig. 1. Schematic diagrams of (a) traditional MDI-CVQKD protocol. Alice and Bob prepare
coherent states independently, and send them to Charlie for Bell state measurement. (b) PP
MDI-CVQKD protocol. Charlie initially launches pulses to Alice and Bob, and then Alice
and Bob reflect back the pulses to Charlie after Gaussian modulation. (c) PP DPM-based
MDI-CVQKD protocol. Charlie still initially launches pulses to Alice and Bob, Alice and Bob
respectively use dual-phase-modulation strategy to encode the information and subsequently
send the pulses back to Charlie. AM, Amplitude modulator; PM, Phase modulator; FM,
Faraday mirror; BS, Beam splitter; BSM, Bell state measurement.
Step 1. Alice randomly prepares a coherent state with complex amplitudes α′ = (x ′A + ip′A)/2
and Bob randomly prepares another coherent state with complex amplitudes β′ = (x ′B + ip′B)/2,
where the local variables X ′ = (x ′A, p′A) andY ′ = (x ′B, p′B) are Gaussian distributed with variances
VA and VB, respectively. Then Alice and Bob send their coherent states to Charlie.
Step 2.After receiving the transmitted coherent states, Charlie performs BSM-based detections.
The coherent states are interfered and measured by the homodyne detectors, and the measurement
results described as variable Z with complex value γ = (xZ + ipZ )/2 are announced by Charlie.
Step 3. When Alice and Bob receive Charlie’s measurement results, they can estimate
the covariance matrix ΓXYZ of the tripartite state ρXYZ , which can be used for the security
analysis [11, 34, 35].
Step 4. Alice and Bob modify their data as X = (xA, pA) and Y = (xB, pB), where
xA = x ′A − kx′A(γ), pA = p′A − kp′A(γ),
xB = x ′B − kx′B (γ), pB = p′B − kp′B (γ).
(1)
Here k is the amplification coefficient related to channel loss, and the variables X and Y represent
the local raw keys of Alice and Bob, respectively.
Step 5. Alice and Bob use an authenticated public channel to finish the error correction and
privacy amplification, and finally generate the identical secret key.
The prepare-and-measure model is usually easy to apply, while considering its security, the
prepare-and-measure model is equivalent to the corresponding entanglement-based model for
convenient security analysis [36]. As shown in Fig. 2, Alice and Bob first prepare two-mode
squeezed vacuum state [Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state] respectively. Each sender keeps
one mode A1(orB1) and sends another mode A2(orB2) to the third party (Charlie) through the
untrusted quantum channel. An eavesdropper, says Eve, may replace the quantum channel between
the two senders and Charlie with her own quantum channel to launch the entangling cloner attacks,
which has been proven to be one kind of the optimal Gaussian collective attack [37, 38]. The
incoming modes A3 and B3 are received by Charlie and subsequently interfered at a beam spiltter
(BS) with two output modes A4 and B4. Then both the x-quadrature of A4 and the p-quadrature
of B4 are measured by homodyne detectors, and the measurement result γ = (xZ + ipZ )/2 are
announced by Charlie. After receiving Charlie’s measurement results, Alice and Bob respectively
displace their own mode A1(orB1) by operations DˆA(γ) and DˆB(γ). Finally, the yielded modes
A and B are measured by heterodyne detectors to generate the raw key {X,Y }.
Fig. 2. Entanglement-based model of MDI-CVQKD protocol with entangling cloner attacks.
Alice and Bob respectively generate EPR pairs and send them to the third party Charlie
through the untrusted quantum channel. Charlie measures the incoming modes using BSM
and subsequently sends the measurement result back to Alice and Bob. ε is excess noise and
η is the transmittance of the quantum channel.
2.2. Design of the PP MDI-CVQKD protocol
The plug-and-play (PP) MDI-CVQKD protocol can be designed on the basis of the traditional
MDI-CVQKD protocol by putting the laser at Charlie’s side instead of applying two lasers at
Alice’s and Bob’s sides. As shown in Fig. 1(b), the data-processing is almost similar, but slightly
different from that of the traditional MDI-CVQKD protocol. Firstly, Charlie sends strong coherent
light to Alice and Bob through a 50:50 beam splitter. Each splited light is transmitted through an
optical fiber, and then reflected by a faraday mirror (FM) of Alice (or Bob). An AM and a PM
are adopted at each side to encode information using Gaussian modulation. Then, the light is sent
back to Charlie, and then BSM and data post-processing are followed to generate the secret keys.
The PP MDI-CVQKD protocol has several remarkable features. It is similar to the traditional
MDI-CVQKD because the signal sent from Charlie to Alice and Bob does not contain any
Gaussian-modulated information, and hence the useful information is only available in the trusted
parts. In addition, the mode matching issue such as the problem of synchronization can be solved
since the lights of Alice and Bob are generated from the same laser so that the spectral modes of
the pulses are identical. From the viewpoint of its experimental implementation, the polarization
drift during the optical fiber transmission can be automatically compensated.
It is necessary to show the effect of the PP configuration on the security of the realistic
MDI-CVQKD. The security against any detector side channel attacks is guaranteed since the PP
configuration does not disturb the measurement setup of the MDI-CVQKD. Moreover, one does
not need to transmit LO through the untrusted channel, but can generate LO locally at Charlie’s
side, which eliminates all LO-aimed attacks in the security analysis.
2.3. Design of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol
So far, the Gaussian-modulated CVQKD protocols, including the Gaussian quantum state,
Gaussian operation and Gaussian measurement, are experimentally feasible and simple for the
mathematical description [30]. As a result, the traditional CVQKD protocols are usually based on
Gaussianmodulation except some discretely-modulated CVQKDprotocols [39–41]. Theoretically,
the Gaussian quantum state can be prepared by using AM and PM. Unfortunately, most of the
widely used AMs, e.g. LiNbO3 modulators, are polarization sensitive and features a polarizer,
where the part of light cannot be transmitted if its orientation is not aligned correctly [33],
resulting in the degenerated performance in practice. To solve this problem, we suggest the
PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol, aiming to eliminate the negative effect of AMs in the
MDI-CVQKD system.
As shown in Fig. 1(c), the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol can be designed from the
PP MDI-CVQKD protocol by replacing AM to an extra fiber link with a PM and a FM at Alice’s
and Bob’s sides. This architecture totally removes AMs so that one does not need to consider
its practical problem in the experimental implementation. In what follows, we show that the PP
DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol is equivalent to the Gaussian-modulated MDI-CVQKD
protocol.
Generally, the Jones matrix of a Faraday mirror can be expressed by
JFM =
[
cos θ sin θ
−sin θ cos θ
] [
1 0
0 −1
] [
cos θ −sin θ
sin θ cos θ
]
=
[
cos (2θ) −sin (2θ)
−sin (2θ) −cos (2θ)
]
. (2)
When the input signal reaches FM and reflects back [42], the complete Jones matrix of the rotated
element can be expressed by
R = T(−δ)JFMT(δ) = ei(ϕo+ϕe )JFM, (3)
where δ is the rotation angle between the reference basis and the eigenmode basis of the
birefringence medium, while ϕo and ϕe are the propagation phases of ordinary and extraordinary
rays, respectively. T(±δ) are the Jones matrices of birefringence medium when the signal goes
forward and backward of the single-mode delay lines, which can be given by
T(±δ) =
[
cos δ ∓sin δ
±sin δ cos δ
] [
eiϕo 0
0 eiϕe
] [
cos δ ±sin δ
∓sin δ cos δ
]
. (4)
Since the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol can be constructively symmetric, we consider
Alice’s data-processing for simplicity. The transformation matrices of the dual-phase modulation
scheme can be given by [33]
JPMA1+FMA1 = T(−δ)JPMA1xRJPMA1yT(δ) = ςA1ei(ϕA1)R, (5)
JPMA2+FMA2 = T(−δ)JPMA2xRJPMA2yT(δ) = ςA2ei(ϕA2)R, (6)
where ςA1 and ςA2 are the equivalent attenuation coefficient of PMA1 and PMA2, ϕA1 and ϕA2 are
electronically modulated phases of PMA1 and PMA2. Suppose the input Jones vector is Alicein,
the output of dual-phase modulation Aliceout after a round trip can be expressed as
Aliceout =
1
2
Alicein(JPMA1+FMA1 + JPMA2+FMA2 )
=
1
2
(ςA1Aliceinei(ϕA1) + ςA2Aliceinei(ϕA2))R.
(7)
In an ideal dual-phase modulation system with perfect optical components, one can get the same
insertion loss in the two arms. Namely we have ς ≈ ςA1 ≈ ςA2, and then the output of dual-phase
modulation can be simplify as
Aliceout = ςAliceinexp
[
i(ϕA1 + ϕA2)
2
]
cos
(ϕA1 − ϕA2
2
)
R. (8)
Similarly, the output of dual-phase modulation at Bob’s side can be given by
Bobout = ςBobinexp
[
i(ϕB1 + ϕB2)
2
]
cos
(ϕB1 − ϕB2
2
)
R. (9)
According to Eq.(8) and Eq.(9), we find that the Gaussian modulation can be implemented by both
senders using two polarization-independent PMs instead of a polarization-dependent AM and PM.
Therefore, the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol is equivalent to the Gaussian-modulated
MDI-CVQKD protocol, leading to the convenient experimental implementation in efficiency.
3. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol in both
asymptotic case [43] and finite-size regime [44,45]. We find that almost all raw keys generated
by the proposed scheme can be used for the final secret key generation when considering the
finite-size effect.
3.1. Asymptotic security of PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol
Fig. 3. Entanglement-based model of PP DPM-basedMDI-CVQKD protocol with entangling
cloner attacks. Charlie prepares two EPR pairs and sends one mode of each to Alice and Bob
through the untrusted quantum channel, respectively. Alice and Bob displace the incoming
modes according to the public BSM result and subsequently measure them with respective
heterodyne detections.
As shown in Fig.(3), we depicts the entanglement-based model of the PP DPM-based MDI-
CVQKD protocol. Since only one laser is used for preparing coherent states at Charlie’s side
instead of adopting two separate lasers at each remote side, the source can be modeled by using
two EPR pairs at Charlie’s side. After Alice and Bob respectively displace their incoming modes
(A1 and B1) according to the BSM results that are publicly announced by Charlie, mode A2 and
mode B2 have the certain correlation. Providing that mode A2 and mode B2 come from the same
EPR pair, it is similar to the CVQKD protocol with an entangled source in the middle [46, 47].
We assume that Eve performs the collective Gaussian attack strategy, which is the best attack
under the direct and reverse reconciliation protocols [37, 38]. In particular, Eve prepares her
ancillary system in a product state for Alice’s and Bob’s side, and the ancilla mode of each side
interacts individually with a single pulse sent to Alice and Bob respectively. The combined state
reads
ρA2E1B2E2 =
∑
a,b
[P(a)|a〉〈a| ⊗ ψaA2E1 ⊕ P(b)|b〉〈b| ⊗ ψbB2E2 ]⊗n. (10)
Eve then launches the entangling cloner attack. Specifically, Eve replaces the channel with
transmittance T and excess noise referred to the input χ by preparing the ancilla |Ei〉 of variance
Wi (i = 1, 2) and a beam splitter of transmittance T . The valueWi can be tuned to match the noise
of the real channel χ = (1 − T)/T + ε. Note that for the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol,
both sides of Alice and Bob are symmetric, i.e., T = T1 = T2. After that, Eve keeps one mode
Ei1 of |Ei〉 and injects the other mode Ei2 into the unused port of each beam splitter and thus
acquires the output mode Ei3. After repeating this process for each pulse, Eve stores her ancilla
modes, Ei1 and Ei3, in quantum memories. Finally, Eve measures the exact quadrature on Ei1
and Ei3 after Charlie reveals the BSM results.
According to the above-mentioned situation, the lower bound of the asymptotic secret key rate
under the collective attack strategy can be given by
Kasym = βI(A : B) − χE, (11)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A : B) is the Shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob, and χE is the Holevo bound of Eve’s information [48]. Assuming that Alice and
Bob have perfect heterodyne detectors, the covariance matrix of the Gaussian state ρG
AB
can be
given by
ΓGAB=
[
aI cσz
cσz bI
]
=
[
[T1V + (1 − T1)W1]I
√
T1T2(V2 − 1)σz√
T1T2(V2 − 1)σz [T2V + (1 − T2)W2]I
]
, (12)
where I and σz represent diag(1, 1) and diag(1,−1), respectively, V is the variance of mode A
and mode B,Wi = Ti χi/(1 − Ti) with the added noise referred to the input χi = (1 − Ti)/Ti + ε.
Therefore, Alice and Bob’s mutual information can be calculated as
I(A : B) = log2
[
b + 1
b + 1 − c2/(a + 1)
]
. (13)
As the proposed protocol is symmetric, the orientation of reconciliation would not have affect on
the performance of the protocol, and thus we only consider the calculation of asymptotic security
key rate in direct reconciliation (the identical result can be obtained in reverse reconciliation).
The mutual information between Alice and Eve can be expressed as
χE = S(E) − S(E |A). (14)
Due to the fact that Eve can provide a purification of Alice and Bob’s density matrix, we obtain
S(E) = S(AB), which is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 of ΓGAB given by
S(AB) = G[(λ1 − 1)/2] + G[(λ2 − 1)/2], (15)
where G(x) = (x + 1)log2(x + 1) − xlog2x is the Von Neumann entropy and the symplectic
eigenvalues λ1,2 are calculated as
λ21,2 =
1
2
[∆ ±
√
∆2 − 4D2], (16)
with ∆ = a2 + b2 − 2c2 and D = ab − c2. After Alice performs heterodyne detection over mode
A, the system BE is pure. This gives S(E |A) = S(B |A) = G[(λ3 − 1)/2], where the symplectic
eigenvalue λ3 = b − c2/(a + 1). See [49] for the detailed derivations.
Fig. 4. The performance of MDI-CVQKD protocols. Blue solid line and red dashed line
denote the asymptotic secret key rate and the tolerable excess noise of the proposed PP
DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol as a function of transmission distance from Alice to
Bob, respectively. As a comparison, blue dotted line denotes the asymptotic secret key rate
of traditional MDI-CVQKD protocol in [27]. The simulation parameters are set as follows:
modulation variance is V = 20, reconciliation efficiency is β = 95% and excess noise for
blue solid line is ε = 0.001.
Fig. (4) shows the performance of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol in asymptotic
case. As a comparison, we also plot the asymptotic secret key rate of the traditional MDI-CVQKD
protocol [27]. We find that the performances of both protocols are similar except for a few minor
discrepancies, i.e. the slight differences in maximal secret key rate and maximal transmission
distance. It shows that the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol features the same security
level as the traditional MDI-CVQKD protocol. It is worth noticing that the aim of this scheme is
not to improve the performance of the MDI-CVQKD protocol, but to show the feasibility and
substitutability of the MDI-CVQKD protocol in experimental implementation. As a result, we
only consider the symmetric case of MDI-CVQKD protocol, i.e., LAC = LBC , regardless of the
asymmetric one, although the latter case can largely improve the transmission distance of the
MDI-CVQKD protocol [26, 27].
3.2. Security of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol in finite-size regime
The above asymptotic security proof is based on an assumption that one considers the security
of a protocol in asymptotic limit of infinitely many signals that are transmitted between Alice
and Bob. However, it is unpractical for implementations. Fortunately, a security framework of
finite-size for the CVQKD protocols has been proposed in [50]. In this framework, the raw key is
no longer infinite and one needs to use part of it to estimate the parameters of the communication
channel. However, it would introduce a tradeoff between the final secret key rate and the accuracy
of parameter estimation step in the finite-size regime. Very recently, [51] shows that this problem
can be solved in traditional MDI-CVQKD protocol. We, here, extend it to the proposed PP
DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol and give the detailed security proof in finite-size regime.
An important procedure of data post-processing is parameter estimation, aiming to acquire the
information of quantum channel such as transmissivity and excess noise, which are relevant for
estimating the security of the CVQKD protocol. In general, local information without classical
communication is not sufficient for parameter estimation, and the only way for obtaining the
precise result of parameter estimation is to sacrifice part of raw key. However, the more raw key
data are used for parameter estimation, the lower is the final secret key rate. In fact, the estimation
of the covariance matrix ΓXYZ of the tripartite state ρXYZ could be done locally by Alice or Bob
without using part of the raw key. In particular, the covariance matrix ΓXYZ can be expressed as
ΓXYZ =

X 0 cXZ
0 Y cYZ
cᵀXZ c
ᵀ
YZ Z
 , (17)
where X = Y =
[
V 0
0 V
]
, the matrix
Z =
[ 〈x2Z〉 〈xZpZ〉
〈xZpZ〉 〈p2Z〉
]
, (18)
is the empirical covariance matrix of (xZ, pZ ), and
cXZ =
[ 〈x ′AxZ〉 〈x ′ApZ〉〈p′AxZ〉 〈p′ApZ〉
]
, cYZ =
[ 〈x ′BxZ〉 〈x ′BpZ〉〈p′BxZ〉 〈p′BpZ〉
]
(19)
are the correlation items.
Since the proposed protocol is based on the MDI-CVQKD structure, where Alice and Bob
modulate coherent states using the DPM scheme and do not perform any measurement at their
own side, the variances of x ′A, p
′
A, x
′
B and p
′
B can be known locally by Alice and Bob. After
Charlie announces the measurement result γ = (xZ + ipZ )/2, Alice computes the empirical
correlations of the matrix cXZ , namely 〈x ′AxZ〉, 〈x ′ApZ〉, 〈p′AxZ〉 and 〈p′ApZ〉. Similarly, Bob can
obtain the empirical correlations of the matrix cYZ . As a result, all the entries of the covariance
matrix ΓXYZ can be calculated locally by Alice and Bob without any extra communication.
Finally, the covariance matrix ΓG
AB
of the Gaussian state ρG
AB
can be achieved by exploiting the
relations Eq. (1). Note that the amplification coefficient k has to be well selected to optimalize
the conditional displacements in both Alice’s and Bob’s sides [27, 51].
Based on the derived covariance matrix ΓG
AB
, the performance of the PP DPM-based MDI-
CVQKD protocol can be estimated by Alice or Bob in finite-size regime. Specifically, the secret
key rate calculated by taking finite-size effect into account is expressed as [50]
K f ini =
n
N
[βI(A : B) − SPE − ∆(n)], (20)
where β and I(A : B) are as the same as the afore-mentioned definitions, PE is the failure
probability of parameter estimation and the parameter ∆(n) is related to the security of the privacy
amplification given by
∆(n) = (2dimH + 3)
√
log2(2/¯)
n
+
2
n
log2(1/PA), (21)
where ¯ is a smoothing parameter, PA is the failure probability of privacy amplification, andH
is the Hilbert space corresponding to the raw key. Since the raw key is usually encoded on binary
bits, we have dimH = 2. We denote N the total exchanged signals and n the number of signals
that is used for sharing key between Alice and Bob. Note that in the conventional calculation the
remained m = N − n signals are used for parameter estimation so that the values are usually set
to be m = n = 12N . However, as we pointed above, the remained signals can be neglected since
parameter estimation can be locally performed without extra information. Therefore, the signals
that are used for estimating can be exploited for transporting more secret keys. That is to say,
almost all raw keys can be used for the final secret key generation without parameter estimation
using part of them, leading to the increased secret key rate of the MDI-CVQKD protocol. In fact,
Alice and Bob still need to share the entries of the estimated covariance matrix, which contain an
amount of raw keys. Fortunately, that amount is negligible as the secret key is very long. As a
result, the value can be set to n ≈ N .
In the conventional finite-size case (needing to sacrifice part of raw keys), SPE needs to
be calculated in parameter estimation procedure where one can find a covariance matrix ΓPE
minimizing the secret key rate with a probability of 1 − PE . It can be calculated by m couples of
correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1· · ·m given by
ΓPE=
(
VI tZσz
tZσz (t2V + σ2)I
)
, (22)
where t = √η and σ2 = 1 + ηε are compatible with m sampled data except with probability
PE/2. The maximum-likelihood estimators tˆ and σˆ2 respectively has the follow distributions
tˆ ∼ (t, σ2∑m
i=1 x
2
i
)
and
mσˆ2
σ2
∼ χ2(m − 1), (23)
where t and σ2 are the authentic values of the parameters. In order to maximize the value of the
Holevo information obtained by Eve with the statistics except with probability PE , the value of
tmin (the lower bound of t) and σ2max (the upper bound of σ2) in the limit of m must be computed,
namely
tmin =
√
η − zPE /2
√
1 + ηε
mX ′
,
σ2max = 1 + ηε + zPE /2
√
2(1 + ηε)√
m
,
(24)
where zPE /2 is such that 1 − erf(zPE /2/
√
2)/2 = PE/2 and erf is the error function defined as
erf(x) = 2
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt . (25)
The above-mentioned error probabilities can be set to ¯ = PE = PA = 1010. Finally, one can
derive the secret key rate using the derived bounds tmin and σ2max .
Actually, we do not need to estimate the secret key rate of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD
protocol like above, but would directly calculate it by the locally obtained covariance matrix
ΓXYZ without complicated estimation process. This is feasible since the correlations between
Alice’s and Bob’s raw keys are post-selected by the relay so that the public variable Z contains
all the information about the correlations between Alice and Bob [51].
Fig. 5 shows the performance of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol with almost all
raw keys are used for generating the final secret key (solid lines) comparing with conventional
finite-size calculation (dashed lines). We find that for each block, especially for the small-length
block, the maximal transmission distance can be extended by directly calculating the locally
obtained covariance matrix, since part of raw key data that should be used for parameter estimation
now is used for generating more final secret keys, giving birth to the increased secret key rate of
the MDI-CVQKD protocol using conventional finite-size calculation.
We note that the CVQKD protocols has been recently proved to be secure against collective
attacks in a composable security framework [52], which is the enhancement of security based
Fig. 5. Finite-size secret key rate of the proposed PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol as a
function of transmission distance. Solid lines show the secret key rate generated from almost
all raw keys (N = n), dashed lines show the secret key rate using conventional finite-size
calculation (N = 2n). From left to right, both lines correspond to block lengths of N = 104,
105, 106, 107 and 108. The parameters are set as same as Fig. 4.
on uncertainty of the finite-size effect so that one can obtain the tightest secure bound of the
protocol by considering each data-processing step in the CVQKD system [53]. We do not give
the detailed proof of the composable security for MDI-based CVQKD protocols here, but it
is reasonable to believe that the performance of the proposed protocol can be improved either
since the conventional proof of composable security also needs to sacrifice part of raw keys for
parameter estimation.
4. Discussion and conclusion
So far we have illustrate the characteristics of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol. As for
its practical implementations, we demonstrate its setup shown in Fig. 6. Charlie generates a series
of strong pulses using continuous-wave (CW) laser. These pulses are splitted into two portions
with an intensity ratio of 99:1, a fraction (1%, red line) of which is used to carry signals while
another fraction (99%, blue line) is used as a locally generated LO. The signals are divided into
two branches by the PBS and then sent to Alice and Bob respectively. For both Alice and Bob,
after being reflected by FM1, the signals are modulated by the DPM scheme and reversely sent
back to Charlie. The incoming modulated signals, subsequently, are interfered with respective
local LOs, aiming to calibrate the incoming signals and monitor its variance in real time. Finally,
the yielded signals from Alice and Bob are used for the BSM.
There are several remarks on the proposed protocol for its implementation. First of all, all LO-
aimed attacks e.g. wavelength attacks, saturation attacks, calibration attacks and LO fluctuation
attacks, can be well defended due to fact that the LO is locally generated by the trusted part
Charlie. Secondly, the synchronization problem of Alice and Bob is eliminated because both
signal and LO come from the same laser. Thirdly, the reference of two signals can be guaranteed
identically and the polarization drifts can be compensated automatically since only one laser
is required for the proposed scheme. Moreover, there is no need to use the traditional LiNbO3
modulators by applying DPM scheme, which takes advantage of the polarization-insensitive
properties of phase modulators so that the coherent-state preparation would not be affected by
the polarization drifts of the fiber channel.
Fig. 6. Experimental concept of the PP DPM-basedMDI-CVQKD protocol. CW, Continuous-
wave laser; BS, Beam splitter; PM, Phase modulator; PBS, Polarizing beam splitter; DL,
Delay line; FM, Faraday mirror; PD, Photoelectric detector; BSM, Bell state measurement.
In conclusion, we have suggested the design of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD with no
extra performance penalty. The proposed scheme waives the necessity of propagation of LO
through the insecure quantum channels. Because a real local LO can be generated from the
same laser of quantum signal at Charlie’s side, it avoids the problems of synchronization of
different lasers as well as the LO-aimed attacks. Moreover, the reference of two signals can
be guaranteed identically and the polarization drifts can be compensated automatically since
only one laser is required for the proposed scheme. Meanwhile, a polarization-insensitive dual-
phase modulation strategy is adopted to Alice’s and Bob’s sides respectively, which shows the
experimental feasibility of preparing Gaussian states. We derive the security bounds against
optimal Gaussian collective attacks. It shows that the proposed scheme works equivalently to
symmetrically modulated Gaussian-state MDI-CVQKD protocols. Since almost entire raw keys
generated by the proposed scheme can be used for final secret key generation when considering
the finite-size effect, the secret key rates of MDI-CVQKD in finite-size regime can be increased.
Moreover, an experimental concept of the proposed scheme, which can be deemed guideline
for final implementation, is demonstrated. In terms of possible future research, we will give the
concrete experimental implementation of the PP DPM-based MDI-CVQKD protocol.
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